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FREE SPEECH AND CHILDREN'S INTERESTS
DAVID ARCHARD*
Amitai Etzioni's essay explores the conflict between freedom of
speech and the protection of children.' He argues that the First
Amendment right of free speech should not trump every other con-
sideration, least of all that of the interests of children. I think he is
right. However I also think that the picture is more complicated than
the one he depicts, and I also believe that there is much to be gained
from being clearer about the underlying warrant for a right to free
speech. Understanding why free speech is valuable is crucial to a
proper appreciation of what forms of speech ought to be allowed and
of who may be included within the scope of persons accorded the
right in question.
Let me start to complicate the picture by turning to the Supreme
Court cases that Etzioni discusses at the outset of his essay. In Gins-
berg v. New York,2 the Court upheld a New York penal law proscrib-
ing the sale of pornographic material to minors. Ten years later, in
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,3 the Court upheld an FCC ruling con-
straining the times at which indecent speech may be transmitted given
that, at certain times, children might be likely to be listening or watch-
ing. Etzioni identifies two principles on which the Court rested its
reasoning: "that children should not be allowed the same access to
certain types of materials as adults, and that the state is entitled to
pass laws aiding parents in carrying out their duties."' 4
This summary compresses reasoning that is, in fact, quite com-
plex. In the first place-and this is something to which I will return-
the Court has always affirmed the view that the absolute constitu-
tional protection of the First Amendment does not simply, and with-
out need of further consideration, extend to all forms of speech.
Second, the Court in Ginsberg acknowledges two interests justifying
* Professor of Philosophy and Public Policy, Institute for Environment, Philosophy and
Public Policy, University of Lancaster.
1. Amitai Etzioni, On Protecting Children from Speech, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 3 (2004).
2. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
3. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
4. Etzioni, supra note 1, at 6.
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the limitation upon the availability of certain types of material to mi-
nors. The first is the recognition of parental authority and the right of
parents to bring up their children as they see fit. Such authority is
"basic in the structure of society."5 Here the Court followed the key
judgment of Prince v. Massachusetts.6 The second interest is an "inde-
pendent interest" the State has in the well-being of the children who
live within its jurisdiction.7
Now it is not entirely clear how these two interests can always be
rendered consistent with one another. If parents have authority-that
is, the right to bring up their children as they determine is appropri-
ate-then the state's role is restricted to ensuring that nothing ob-
structs parents in the exercise of this basic right. The problem with
children having access to certain materials is that any parental deci-
sion as to whether or not their children should have access to the ma-
terial in question is bypassed or subverted. It is not that parents
would necessarily deny their children such access and would in conse-
quence need the state's assistance in enforcing this denial of access.
Note that in Ginsberg, the Court was explicit that "the prohibition
against sales to minors does not bar parents who so desire from pur-
chasing the magazines for their children."8 Similarly, in Pacifica
Foundation, the Court made it clear that the state, in preventing the
dissemination of indecent speech to children, leaves "to parents the
decision as to what speech of this kind their children shall hear and
repeat."9 On this view, the right of a parent to choose what her chil-
dren shall see and do is primary. The state's role is simply to see to it
that parents can exercise this right freely and without improper con-
straint. If parents would rather that their children did not have access
to certain kinds of material, then the state will ensure that the law
blocks access. If, by contrast, parents choose to let their children see
certain materials, then the state will not intervene since it should not
place obstacles in their way.
However, this latter permission sits uneasily with the role the
state has as a protector of its children, a role which derives from an
acknowledgement of its legitimate interest in the welfare of the
young. This is an interest that is "independent"'10 and "transcen-
5. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639.
6. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
7. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 640.
8. Id. at 639.
9. 438 U.S. at 758.
10. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 640.
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dent."" It would seem to follow that if the state determines that chil-
dren should not have access to material that is harmful to their inter-
ests, then it would be obligated to deny them such access, whatever
the children's parents' views on the matter might be. There is then an
evident tension between the state's concession to the parents or
guardians of a right of choice over their children's lives and the same
state's role as a protector of children. Relevant here, and serving to
underpin this latter role, is the ideal of the state as parens patriae,
literally the "parent of his or her country." The idea is that the state
extends its protection to those individuals within its jurisdiction who
cannot care for themselves. The class of such persons includes, but is
evidently not exhausted by, children.
Notably, a parens patriae acts as a parent "in the last instance."
The state only takes parental responsibilities on itself when others
cannot or do not do so, that is, when there is a clear failure of parent-
hood on the part of those to whom parental responsibilities have been
or might have been accorded "in the first instance." In our societies,
such responsibilities in the first instance are accorded to the child's
natural parents, or to guardians who stand to the child in a salient and
appropriate relationship. The modern liberal state is a "state of fami-
lies," as Amy Gutman nicely expresses it, by contrast with a "family
state."'12 The latter is one in which the state assumes direct
responsibility for the upbringing of the young.13 Plato infamously
recommended this for his class of guardians in The Republic. In the
"state of families," the state is content for children to be reared in
families that enjoy a degree of autonomy and protection from official
interference in the conduct of their affairs. According this autonomy
to parents is not only thought of as a natural extension of a funda-
mental right that individuals have to form families, but is also, on
balance and in general, in the best interests of children. By contrast, it
would not be good for children-nor would it be conducive to the
reproduction of the right kind of society and polity-to have the state
assume direct and unmediated control of the rearing of children.
The upshot of this discussion is as follows. Should children be al-
lowed to read obscene materials if their parents are happy for them to
do so? If such a choice is viewed as one that falls within the proper
remit of parental discretion inasmuch as the child's interests are not
11. Id. (quoting People v. Kahan, 206 N.E.2d 333, 334 (1965)).
12. AMY GUTMAN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 22,28 (1987).
13. Id. at 23.
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seriously adversely affected, then the answer is clearly "yes." If, on
the other hand, one believes that any parent who allows her child to
read such material is exposing the child to serious harm, and thus is
palpably failing in her parental responsibilities, then it will be appro-
priate for the state as parens patriae to interfere. In that instance, the
answer to the question posed is clearly "no." As a result, I think it is
evident that whether or not children should be allowed to read ob-
scene materials if their parents are happy for them to do so is cru-
cially dependent upon the age of the child. The parent who allows her
five-year-old to view explicit, obscene material is exposing that child
to serious harm, and the state, as parens patriae, may legitimately in-
terfere to protect the child. Things are evidently not so simple when
we imagine that it is a sixteen-year-old who is allowed to view the
material in question.
Of course, now an additional complicating factor is a strong in-
tuition that a young person should be able to make her own choices-
at least with respect to what she does and does not read. It is not just
that it is moot whether exposure to obscenity is harmful to the inter-
ests of a teenager. It might be. The point is that when a certain age is
reached, we believe that it is for the individual herself to determine
whether she wishes to expose herself to putative dangers. What that
age is will obviously be open to serious, and probably intractable,
debate. It is also clear that we will think that the age at which young-
sters should be permitted to engage in different kinds of activities will
vary in line with the nature-the significance, seriousness, and conse-
quential import-of the engagements in question. We think, for ex-
ample, that the age at which someone should be allowed to have sex
need not be the same age at which they should be permitted to work
for money, to vote, or to serve in the armed forces of their country.
I need then to turn to a consideration of whether children have a
right to free speech. But before I do so, I will consider what it means
to protect and promote the interests of children. In particular I want
to do two things. I want, first, to draw attention to an ambiguity in the
import of talk of a child's interests -namely, the ambiguity between
the child's interests as a child and the child's interests as a future
adult. Second, I want to note that society as a whole has an interest in
the protection of children's interests. Etzioni follows the American
courts in judging that "there is a compelling public interest to protect
children from harmful cultural products which should remain freely
[Vol179:83
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accessible to adults."'14 In his discussion of age-graded protections, he
notes that children "clearly are developmental creatures whose capa-
bilities change a great deal as they mature."'5 I am happy to follow
him in both claims. His appeal to the fact of a child's developmental
nature is intended to support the entirely plausible view-and one to
which I shall return-that children of a certain age simply lack the
capacities that their adult counterparts do. It is in consequence of this
that children may rightfully be denied the rights that adults have.
However, the fact that children do, normally, grow up into adults
has a further significant implication. When we harm a child, we can
also thereby harm the adult she will grow into. Indeed it may be that
the harm we do now to this child is best thought of as a harm to the
future adult-or that the greater part of the harm that is done by the
present action is one done to the future adult. Consider, thus, that
denying a child an education certainly deprives the child of cognitive
stimulation, enjoyment, and access to knowledge. But it also limits
the future opportunities of the mature adult whom the child will be-
come.
In this vein, Joel Feinberg has spoken of a subclass of rights pos-
sessed only by children, which he entitles "rights-in-trust."' 6 These are
rights given to the child, but held in trust for the person of the adult
she will become. Feinberg thinks the most important of these is a
child's right to an "open future," that is, to the maximal possible
range of subsequent autonomous choices as an adult. In somewhat
similar fashion, John Eekelaar has spoken of a child's "developmen-
tal" rights.18 These are the rights a child has to develop her potential
in such a manner that she can enter adulthood without serious disad-
vantage. 9 Feinberg ascribes the rights to the child's adult-self, the
child having them only in an "anticipatory" form. Eekelaar, by con-
trast, attributes the rights in question to the adult's child-self. This
need make no important difference so long as we grant-what some
philosophers will, I agree, represent as metaphysically contentious-
14. Etzioni, supra note 1, at 33.
15. Id. at 46.
16. Joel Feinberg, The Child's Right to an Open Future, in WHOSE CHILD?: CHILDREN'S
RIGHTS, PARENTAL AUTHORITY, AND STATE POWER 124, 125 (William Aiken & Hugh
La Follette eds., 1980).
17. Id. at 124-27.
18. John Eekelaar, The Emergence of Children's Rights, 6 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 161,
170-71 (1986).
19. Id.
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that the child and the adult she eventually becomes are merely dis-
tinct temporal stages, or "slices," of one and the same person. Being
the same person, she has the same set of interests. These interests are
merely differently distributed across her lifetime. So long then as we
can talk of the child-self or of the adult-self as stages of the same per-
son, we can acknowledge that in preventing harms from befalling a
child, we may also, and in anticipation, be protecting the interests of
the adult that the child will become. Moreover, the interests an adult
has, as and when an adult, are not those she had as a child.
There is a further point. One reason for preventing a person
from growing up in a certain way is that it is not in her interests to do
so. Being deprived of an early education is harmful to the life oppor-
tunities of the adult. However, society also has an interest in ensuring
that its children grow up to be the sorts of adults who can play their
part in maintaining the fabric of that society. Thus, those who have
not received an education will be incapable of undertaking certain
jobs. They may also be insufficiently capable of discharging their ob-
ligations as citizens. It is evident, then, that the state has an important
"reproductive role" to play in contradistinction to, and in addition to,
its role as parens patriae. A state has an interest in securing over time
the continued preconditions of its own future existence. I do not
mean to imply that the state has a transcendent interest in its own
preservation that somehow bears no connection to the interests and
rights of its citizens, both present and future. A state that secures the
conditions of its own future existence thereby serves the interests of
those who will be under its continued protection. This is the ultimate
warrant for the state's existence. Moreover, any plausible account of
what a state is permitted to do in order to secure its own future-
what kinds of citizenship education it may compel, for instance-must
in the last analysis be grounded in the interests and rights of its future
citizens.
The preconditions of a state's future existence are varied. It is
not just, for instance, that the population must not grow too small or
too large to sustain itself. The population must also be fit and able to
supply, among other things, workers, an army, lawyers, and politi-
cians. It has been suggested that the British state's historical adoption
of the role of parens patriae was motivated less by an unmediated and
socially disinterested concern for the condition of children at the
time-extensive poverty, overcrowded housing, illiteracy and poor
health-but rather by two concerns. The first concern was that home-
[Vol 79:83
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less and "street" children posed a worrying threat to social order. A
compulsory basic education might ensure that children could be
schooled for productive factory work.20 The second concern was the
large number of young recruits to the army who were failing their
medical examinations at a time when the interests of the British Em-
pire needed defending on several fronts.2' The British state wanted
healthy, educated, and adequately housed children who would, in
consequence, not be lawless vagabonds, but might play their part in
the economic progress and military defense of their nation.
How is this relevant to the case of free speech and obscenity? In
Part IV of his article, Etzioni examines the evidence concerning the
scope and the nature of the harm done to children by exposure to
pornography and violence. He notes that the evidence shows that
"significant harm is caused,"22 and concludes that "social science data
strongly support the need to protect children from harmful material,
especially from exposure to violence in the media and on the Inter-
net. '23 I see no reason to dispute either the accumulated evidence or
the normative conclusion he draws from it. What, however, is note-
worthy is Etzioni's citation of longitudinal studies, that is, those pieces
of empirical research following the careers of children who have
viewed violent material into adulthood. The evidence cited is consis-
tent in suggesting that children exposed to violence are more likely, as
adults, to be aggressive, violent, and even criminal.
Again, I do not seek to dispute the findings. The important point
is that there are two very different kinds of claims. One is that expos-
ing children to violence does harm to children as children-by, for
instance, making them more fearful and anxious, or by disposing chil-
dren to be more aggressive to their peers. The other is that exposing
children to violence produces, or tends to produce, more violent
adults disposed to do harm to other adults. The state, in its role as
parens patriae, has a reason to think, in respect of the truth of the first
claim, that children should be protected from harmful material. The
state, in its reproductive role, has a reason in respect of the truth of
the second claim to think that children should be protected from
harmful material. Inasmuch as both claims are true, or probably true,
20. LIONEL ROSE, THE EROSION OF CHILDHOOD: CHILD OPPRESSION IN BRITAIN 1860-
1918, at 6 (1991).
21. GEORGE K. BEHLMER, CHILD ABUSE AND MORAL REFORM IN ENGLAND, 1870-1908,
at 204 (1982).
22. Etzioni, supra note 1, at 35.
23. Id. at 39.
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the state thereby has a double reason to limit the access of children to
certain kinds of material. However, the truth of both claims should
not obscure the fact that there are two claims, and thus two very dif-
ferent kinds of reason for favoring restrictive legislation.
I have argued that the role of the state in respect of the protec-
tion of children's interests is a complex one. The state itself has a
double role, as a protector in the last instance of the vulnerable who
cannot protect themselves, and as a guarantor of the future flourish-
ing of the society for which it legislates. Parents also have interests.
Indeed they arguably have a right to bring up their children as they
see fit, subject to the constraint-which the state as parens patriae will
enforce-that they do not, in doing so, seriously harm the children.
What then of the children themselves? What of their rights, putative
or actual? What, more particularly, of a child's right to free speech? If
a child does have a right to free speech or, more precisely, has one in
just the same way that an adult does, then much of the preceding dis-
cussion is simply besides the point, for rights are thought to trump
other considerations.14 Thus, if a child has a right to free speech, then
the state would be enjoined to protect it and could not successfully
appeal to grounds on which it might be constrained.
Under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child, a child-which Article 1 incidentally defines as any human
being under the age of eighteen years "unless under the law applica-
ble to the child, majority is attained earlier"-is accorded a large
number of rights.25 One of them is a right to freedom of expression.2 6
This is specified as encompassing the "freedom to seek, receive and
impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, ei-
ther orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any
other media of the child's choice."27 Restrictions are permitted only
"[f]or respect of the rights or reputations of others," or "[f]or the pro-
tection of national security or of public order..., or of public health
or morals. ' 28 The United States, shamefully, has not ratified the Con-
vention (the only other non-ratifying country is Somalia). It is thus
not bound by its terms.
24. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 190-92 (1977).
25. Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted and opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989,
1577 U.N.T.S. 44, 46.
26. Id. at 48-49 (art. 13).
27. Id. at 48.
28. Id. at 48-49 (art. 13(2)(a)-(b)).
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However, the Supreme Court, in Tinker v. Des Moines Inde-
pendent Community School District, affirmed its view that school stu-
dents at least "are 'persons' under our Constitution... possessed of
fundamental rights which the State must respect."2 9 It does not, of
course, follow that because children are legally accorded fundamental
rights-whether the legal instrument in question is a national consti-
tution or an international covenant -that this ascription of fundamen-
tal rights to children is morally defensible. It is thus notable that
Justice Stewart stated his view, in Ginsberg, that a constitutional
guarantee of free choice presupposes a capacity to choose which a
child is not possessed of, or at least not fully possessed of.30 He re-
affirmed this view in his concurring judgment in Tinker.3 His com-
ments indicate a principal reason for thinking of children as not pos-
sessed of the rights that adults have. This is an appeal to the simple
fact that children lack the capacity or capacities that are seen as an
essential qualification for rights-holders. A defender of the view that
children should have rights, for his part, can allow that everything
turns on the question of capacity,32 and straightforwardly deny that
children lack the requisite capacity.
Much of the debate about children's rights does, as a result, ap-
peal to claims about their lack or possession of a requisite capacity.
For instance, one set of questions about rights concerns what it is to
have a right. The will theory asserts that a right is a protected exercise
of choice; the interest theory, by contrast, views a right as the protec-
tion of an interest of sufficient importance to impose on others cer-
tain duties. 33 Defenders of the will theory are prepared to concede
that since children lack an ability to exercise choice, they cannot have
rights. Or, at best, they do have rights, but the choices that are consti-
tutive of these rights are made not by the children themselves, but
instead by their representatives. 34 On the other side of the debate, at
least one prominent defender of the interest theory sees the fact that
29. 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
30. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649-50.
31. 393 U.S. at 514-15.
32. See HOWARD COHEN, EQUAL RIGHTS FOR CHILDREN ix (1980).
33. Prominent defenders of the will theory include H.L.A. Hart and Hillel Steiner. See
H.L.A. Hart, Bentham on Legal Rights, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 171-201
(A.W.B. Simpson ed., 1973); HILLEL STEINER, AN ESSAY ON RIGHTS 58 (1994). A prominent
defender of the interest theory is J. Raz. See J. Raz, Legal Rights, 4 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1
(1984).
34. Hart, supra note 33, at 192 n.86.
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children do have rights as enough to discredit the will theory, thus
making children a "test-case" for which theory of rights is correct.35
There is another set of questions about capacity that is relevant
to the issue of whether children do or do not have rights. This is not
the capacity which is constitutive of having any right at all, but the
capacities which are specific to particular kinds of rights and, indeed,
to particular individual rights. A familiar distinction in the categoriza-
tion of rights according to their content-what they are rights to-is
that between "welfare" and "liberty" rights. Welfare rights are rights
to those things that may be characterized as the necessary and impor-
tant preconditions or constituents of a human being's well-being, such
as health, education, and housing. Liberty rights are rights to exercise
choice in some activity that is properly regarded as a central part of
one's life, such as voting, religion, association, and speech.
How is capacity relevant here? Children may be thought of as
lacking certain cognitive abilities, those, most centrally, involved in
the acquisition and processing of information in an ordered fashion.
Thus children are not able to form consistent and stable beliefs, and
to appreciate the significance of options and their consequences.
Children also lack certain volitional abilities. They are not able to
form consistent enduring desires in the light of which they can then
act. Nor can they formulate independent choices that are a function
of stable beliefs and desires. These claims are made with an obvious
qualification. What is true of some children, defined by the United
Nations Convention as anyone under eighteen years of age, is not
true of all of them. The very young child does lack those adult capaci-
ties that the youngster on the cusp of adulthood need not, and proba-
bly will not. The three-year-old is a very different creature from the
seventeen-year-old. Children are developmental creatures who grow
into adulthood and thus, in consequence, grow into the possession of
the abilities that qualify adults for their warranted possession of
rights. If children do lack rights, they do not lack them simply because
they are children. Rather, it is their childishness, as a condition of
incapacity reliably associated with young age, which disqualifies them.
Note that childishness in this sense is not a feature only of children.
Some adults, for instance, the very seriously mentally disabled, are
childlike.
35. See NEIL MACCORMICK, LEGAL RIGHTS AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 154-66 (1982).
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A child incapable of exercising choice is reasonably disqualified
from having liberty rights. Someone who is not able to choose surely
cannot have a right whose content is a fundamental choice. Indeed
the point of having a liberty right is to protect the exercise of choice
in a crucial area of one's life. The child can neither properly exercise
choice nor recognize why it is important to be permitted to exercise
choice in this regard. Thus I do not think that children can be said to
have the right to freedom of expression that is protected by the First
Amendment. It does not follow that the age at which the law deter-
mines that a child does acquire the adult right of free expression is
rightly fixed at eighteen, or at whatever age positive conventional law
in most states does settle upon. Nor does it follow that there is official
license to silence the views of children. Children may not have a right
to free speech, but that does not mean that they can make no claim
upon the authorities to have their views heard. Indeed, one of the
most important articles of the United Nations Convention, Article 12,
accords to the child the right freely to express her views on matters
affecting her. It adds the crucial assurance that these views will be
given "due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the
child."3 6
The principle that a child's views on its own welfare should be
heard, and accorded appropriate influence, is a central principle of
United Kingdom law and social policy in respect of the child. It
should be noted-and this is critical to the current discussion-that
this right stands in the place of a liberty right to make one's own
choices. The right to be heard is only a right to make use of the op-
portunity to influence whomever it is who will otherwise choose for
the child. The authority to choose on behalf of the child still rests with
some appropriate adult. At most the child has the right to represent
to this adult her views as to what should happen to her, and to be
taken as seriously as her age and maturity permits. At a certain age,
the child becomes mature enough to make her own choices. She is
then an adult.
This was the import of the celebrated British House of Lords
judgment, Gillick v. West Norfolk & Wisbech Area Health Authority.37
This case concerned the right of doctors to advise young people,
without and even against parental consent, on sexual and contracep-
tive matters. The judgment has subsequently exercised considerable
36. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 25, art. 12, at 48.
37. [1986] A.C. 112.
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influence in the determination of cases of putative medical consent
given or withheld by young persons. In a critical, and much quoted,
part of his judgment, Lord Scarman, gave concise expression to what
he viewed as the "underlying principle of the law": "[P]arental right
yields to the child's right to make his own decisions when he reaches a
sufficient understanding and intelligence to be capable of making up
his own mind on the matter requiring decision. '38 It is consistent with
British law, and a plausible account of how the law should treat chil-
dren, to think as follows. Children have a right to make known their
views on any matter affecting their welfare. These views must be ac-
corded a weight that is proportionate to the individual child's matur-
ity and understanding of the matter in question. At a certain point in
their development, children are sufficiently mature to determine for
themselves what shall happen to them. In effect, they grow into the
possession of adult liberty rights.
If a child has a right to express views on issues that touch on her
own welfare, but does not have an adult right to free expression, we
need to know more about the nature of the latter right. A first and
important feature of this right is that the correlative duty-one which
we may think of the state as being obligated to discharge-is to not
interfere with citizens' expressions of speech. It is a negative duty of
inaction. It is not a positive duty of assistance in the facilitation of
expression, nor in the transmission of any views expressed. I have a
right to express my views. I do not have a right that these views
should be read or heard by everyone whom I might wish should have
access to them. At most, I have the right that the state shall not in its
laws and policies unreasonably restrict access. Thus the individual
who utters a view that is offensive to some group of people, even if he
has a right to make the utterance, does not have a right that those
who will be offended by it shall hear it. Somebody who has a right to
manufacture and sell pornographic material does not have a right that
everyone shall be exposed to this material. Thus, an adult who sells or
makes available obscene material cannot insist that the state assist
him in his venture by publicizing the existence of the material or by
ensuring that everybody is brought into contact with it. He can com-
plain if, without good reason, some group of individuals are disabled
or prevented from having access to the obscene material. But, as
Etzioni argues, there is in the case of children a very good reason to
38. Id. at 186.
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restrict or regulate access. I concur with the conclusion of his argu-
ment. It is right to exclude children from the audience of those who
utter, write, publish, and disseminate certain kinds of obscene mate-
rial. This is because the present and future selves of children are irre-
trievably damaged by exposure to such material.
However, this leaves unanswered the question of whether those
who would utter, write, publish, and disseminate obscene material
have a right to do so. More particularly, do they have a right to do so
that is grounded in a general right of free expression? Is the right to
free expression a right to the unfettered expression of any utterance?
The law in the United Kingdom is less concessive to the right of the
pornographer than in the United States. The United Kingdom, previ-
ously a signatory to the European Convention of Human Rights, has
now incorporated this convention into its own legislation by the Hu-
man Rights Act of 1998.19 Article 10 accords a right of freedom of
expression, but notably allows the state to justify an interference with
expression for, inter alia, "the prevention of disorder or crime" and
"for the protection of health or morals. ' 40 Moreover, the European
Court of Human Rights has allowed states a significant margin of
appreciation in its enforcement of this right, and it has tolerated states
interfering with non-political modes of speech to a much greater ex-
tent than it tolerates in respect of political speech.41 Thus, the Court
upheld the United Kingdom's banning of a book for children entitled
The Little Red Schoolbook, which contained a substantial chapter on
sex.
42
The Video Recordings Act of 1984 set up a British Board of Film
Classification ("BBFC").43 The Board's remit includes determining
the suitability of a video work for a particular certificate with special
regard to the harm that may be caused to individual viewers who are
likely to see it, including children. In Regina v. Video Appeals Com-
mittee of the British Board of Film Classification,44 the court deter-
mined that in the case of seven hard-core pornographic videos, the
BBFC's refusal to issue a restricted certificate was not supported by a
39. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42.
40. Id. at sch. 1.
41. See DAVID FELDMAN, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN ENGLAND AND
WALES 906 (2d ed. 2002).
42. Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1976).
43. Video Recordings Act, 1984, c. 39.
44. [2000] E.M.L.R. 850. See generally Risk of Harm does not Require Automatic Refusal,
THE TIMES OF LONDON, June 7, 2000, at 33.
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demonstration that significant harm to young people was likely.45 This
judgment does expand the range of permissible material available on
videos. However, it is noteworthy that the court considered empirical
evidence as to the harmfulness of pornography to be a salient consid-
eration in the restriction of the access of such material to children.
Moreover, commentators have pointed out that had other kinds of
evidence been taken into account, the judgment might well have fa-
vored the initial restriction. The court did not, as arguably it should
have done, balance any Article 10 right of free expression against the
United Kingdom's obligation, as a signatory to the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child, to provide each and every
child with "special safeguards and care, including legal protection. ' 46
In the United States, of course, freedom of speech has privileged
constitutional protection. However, the Supreme Court has long rec-
ognized that the First Amendment does not grant judicial protection
to each and every speech act. In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, Jus-
tice Murphy stated, with admirable concision, the following view:
"There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been
thought to raise any Constitutional problem. ''47 The Court specifies
these as the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and insulting
or "'fighting' words." Now it is possible to argue that speech, as
such, remains protected, and protected absolutely. However, certain
well-defined categories of "speech" are, in fact, more properly classi-
fied as harmful actions which thereby fall under the scope of the
criminal law. John Stuart Mill argued along these lines when, in dis-
cussing incitement, he insisted that it would be a mistake to "pre-
tend[] that actions should be as free as opinions." But rather, "even
opinions lose their immunity when the circumstances in which they
are expressed are such as to constitute their expression a positive in-
stigation to some mischievous act. ' 49 Mill could be interpreted as say-
ing that expressions as such are protected by the law, but that uttering
certain words in certain contexts amounts to an incitement to the
commission of criminal acts, and thus as being in itself a criminal act.
45. FELDMAN, supra note 41, at 953.
46. Susan Edwards, Comment, The Video Appeals Committee and the Standard of Legal
Pornography, 2001 CRIM. L. REV., 305,310.
47. 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
48. Id. at 572.
49. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 119 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin Books
1985) (1859).
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One could argue somewhat differently and maintain that some speech
acts are rightly exempt from legal regulation and other speech acts
are not. The peril of arguing in this fashion is that nothing of special
significance then attaches to expressive speech as a kind of human
action. Rather each and every type of speech must be shown to war-
rant legal exemption.
At this point it is important, thus, to be clear about the warrant
for a right to free expression. We can speak of the general justifying
ground of a right, what it is that is of sufficient importance to support
the ascription of the right to the relevant class of individuals. This is
not the same thing as a justification of the right-such as might be
offered by a consequentialist-along the lines of showing that the
possession and exercise of the right in question is, generally and on
balance, productive of good. The contrast is one between what we
might call respectively a foundational and an instrumental justifica-
tion of a right. Now, further, even if a right is foundationally justified,
it does not follow that there are no considerations-such as those of
the public good-of sufficient weight to trump the right in specified
circumstances. So, even if it is said that there is a right to free expres-
sion (rather than to a subset of expressions) which can be foundation-
ally justified, it does not follow that the right may be exercised in all
conceivable circumstances. In whatever manner a right is justified, it
will most probably not be justified as having absolute weight suffi-
cient to trump all other relevant claims. In Chaplinsky, for example,
Justice Murphy continued, immediately after the statement already
cited, with the following observation in justification of the legal regu-
lation of some classes of speech: "It has been well observed that such
utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of
such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in or-
der and morality."50
His comments suggest that he, and the Court, favors an instru-
mental justification of free speech, namely, that it conduces to the
truth. Free speech is valuable not in itself, but inasmuch as it produces
or tends to produce something else that is valuable, namely the hold-
ing of true beliefs. This view informs John Stuart Mill's celebrated
and influential defense of freedom of expression in On Liberty. For
Mill censorship is improper because it presumes that the censor is
50. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
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infallible, taking his own views not just as true, but as indisputably
true. But such a presumption is unjustified because truth, if it emerges
at all, does so only through a "collision of adverse opinions," that is,
in a context of the uncensored expression of each and every view.51
Given such an instrumental justification of free speech, it is easy to
see why the listed classes of speech lacking First Amendment protec-
tion are so exempt. Lewd and obscene utterances, to take just one
instance, do not seek to speak the truth, nor to lead us to see what the
truth is.52
However, such a defense of free speech is vulnerable to the obvi-
ous observation that very many instances of speech falling outside the
unprotected classes are not truth-conducive. This may be so because
they are the kind of utterance that is not truth-apt, such as those
within the world of art, theater, and literature. Or, it may be that we
can be confident that an utterance, even while it has a truth-value and
is uttered in the knowledge that it does, will not conduce to the truth.
But the right to free expression protects the stupid, the misguided, the
ill informed, and the credulous as much as it does the wise. It would
not of course follow that utterances that do not conduce to the truth
ought to be proscribed. It would need, further, to be shown that there
were significant social interests served by proscription. Nevertheless,
the instrumental defense requires that free speech serve the public
good, even if proscribing some particular instance of speech must be
shown to serve a greater public good.
I believe that the proper defense of free speech is not instrumen-
tal, seeing its value in what good it is productive of. Rather, it is foun-
dational, seeing its value in what it is important for humans to be able
to do when they are free to express themselves. There are various
possible versions of a foundational defense of free speech, including
one that simply sees freely expressing oneself as itself an expression
of an autonomy that ought to be protected. For my own part, I view
the foundational value in question as that of our being heard as the
source of beliefs, desires, and values. Human beings are social and
expressive creatures. Giving expression to what we as individuals
think, fear, and hope for is an extremely important way that we can
51. MILL, supra note 49, at 116.
52. Ronald Dworkin is skeptical about the possibility of defending a right to pornography
as derivative from a right of free expression and instead sees it as based upon an equal right of
"moral independence," that is, a right to lead one's life according to one's own moral values free
from state regulation. See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 336-72 (1985).
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be ourselves in a world of other humans. Speaking freely is an intrin-
sically valuable mode of self-expression within a social context. It is
not valuable because it yields some further distinct good. Consider
the political sphere. Of course free speech may be instrumentally
valuable inasmuch as the unconstrained statement of what we think
and value plays its role in the formation of law and policy. What we
want politically to come about may be more likely to come about be-
cause we say that is what we want. However, speaking freely in the
political domain is, in the first instance, a mode of civic self-
expression, the way in which we converse together as citizens in the
polis. It is valuable as such and in itself. Similarly, voting can be seen
as instrumentally valuable, a means within an agreed decision-making
procedure to secure a valued outcome. However, it is also intrinsically
valuable, because participation as such in the process of democratic
decision-making is a good.
If speaking as such is valuable, it does not follow that every man-
ner or mode of self-expression is equally valuable. Nor does it follow
that the foundational value of self-expression on every occasion
trumps every other relevant moral consideration. The lewd and ob-
scene, the profane, the libelous, and insulting utterances are ways in
which humans give expression to their desires and beliefs. However, a
significant social harm may be avoided by disallowing their expres-
sion, one that is sufficiently important to outweigh the particular
value of this mode of self-expression. In the case of "fighting words,"
it may be that the utterance is rendered by the context and intentions
of the person uttering the words into an action, a provocation, or in-
citement to harmful conduct. In such a case, words are uttered but
that is not enough for the utterance to be viewed as an expression
meriting, in principle at least, the protection of a right. Indeed, some
have argued that pornography is properly characterized as a kind of
speech act. Moreover, it is an action whose consequential import is
the subversion of the equal status of women as humans deserving
respect. As such, pornography is not a mode of expression that should
be protected by the First Amendment, but a violation of the require-
ment of the equality of all before the law.53
To sum up, seeing the foundational value of the right to free
speech as consisting in the value of expressing ourselves allows us to
see why some modes of expression are not as valuable as others-and
53. See Rae Langton, Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 293 (1993).
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to see what forms of "speech" are improperly so called. It also allows
us to see why children do not have a right to free speech. Earlier it
was suggested that the childishness of children-that disqualifies
them from having rights-is their lack of certain abilities. Children
lack those cognitive abilities that would allow them to form consistent
and stable beliefs, and lack those volitional abilities that would allow
them to form consistent enduring desires. It is easy now to see how,
on the foundational account of the value of free speech just pre-
sented, this childish incapacity renders expression of little or no value
to children. Children do not have desires and beliefs in the way that
adults do, and expressing themselves does not, in consequence, have
the value for children that it does for adults. That is not to say that the
expression by children of their transient desires and inconstant beliefs
is of no value. Nor is it to deny that the more enduring these beliefs
and desires become the greater is the value of their expression. How-
ever, the value of expression to children is not sufficiently great, as it
is with adults, to warrant ascribing to them a right of free expression.
We saw that Article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child, as does British law, accords to the child the right
freely to express her views on matters affecting her, these views being
given a weight proportionate to the age and maturity of the child.
Why is this right valuable? Here it seems to me that the value of the
right is instrumental. What matters is not simply that the child says
what she thinks, but that what she says plays some part in the deter-
mination of what shall happen to her. A child's expression of her
views in respect of what touches on her welfare is something of a
guide to what does, indeed, promote or adversely affect her well-
being. A child is not the best guide to her own welfare. If she were
such a guide, then she would most probably be possessed of a capac-
ity to lead her own life that would merit the attribution to her of lib-
erty rights.
However, it is important to give some weight to a child's own
views. In the first place, what a child says matters to her provides any
guardian or mentor with invaluable evidence as to what in fact is best
to do for her. Second, doing to or for the child what is too far at vari-
ance from what the child herself wants to be done is unlikely to pro-
mote the child's best interests. Consider a doctor trying to decide the
best medical procedure for a child. The child's views-her extreme
dislike of or fear about a certain procedure, for example-must guide
the physician in his determination of the best course of action. He
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would be acting unwisely if he chose to pursue an option that the
child resolutely opposed.
I conclude that, inasmuch as children do not have a right to free
expression, as guaranteed to adults by the First Amendment, no
wrong is done to them by denying them access to certain kinds of
material, such as pornography. If parents do have a right to determine
what their children shall read and view, they do so only so long as
their parental decisions do not expose their children to significant
harms, or to the serious risk thereof. The state, in its role as parens
patriae, is entrusted with the protection of children as vulnerable,
dependent creatures incapable of protecting their own interests. In its
reproductive role, the state is warranted in ensuring that children
grow into the right kind of future adult citizens. All of this supports
Etzioni's conclusion that children may be protected from speech that
is otherwise constitutionally guaranteed. It does so, however, for dif-
ferent and, I hope, instructively different reasons.
Moreover, what I have said leaves open the question of what ma-
terials may be adjudged to expose children, in their present or future
adult selves, to sufficiently grave harm to merit state regulation of
access. How we should understand what shall count as a serious harm
is a normative matter to be resolved by philosophical, legal, and po-
litical argumentation. Whether something causes a serious harm is an
empirical matter to be resolved by full and adequate research. For
example, consider the claim that there is a causal relationship be-
tween television viewing and the acquisition of beliefs in traditional
gender roles.5 4 The question of whether that is so is a matter for so-
cial-psychological research. Whether, if true, it matters enough to
warrant the regulation of the content of television, or of children's
access to certain programs, is an issue of legal and political dispute.
There is a further question. The status of children as develop-
mental creatures who are not yet adults has been at the very center of
this Article's argument. Children normally grow into adults, but they
do not do so unaided. Children need to be nurtured, taught, and
cared for, all with a view to what they can and should become as
adults. Children have then what Eekelaar would call a "developmen-
tal" right to those things that are a necessary means to their successful
maturation into adulthood. Nevertheless, what those are and exactly
when children should have them is a deeply contested matter. All can
54. See KEVIN DURKIN, TELEVISION, SEX ROLES AND CHILDREN: A DEVELOPMENTAL
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL ACCOUNT 74-83 (1985).
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surely agree that children should have access to the factual informa-
tion, views, and beliefs that they need for their cognitive and emo-
tional development. But there will be disagreement as to whether
some materials at certain ages are educationally necessary or, on the
contrary, harmful to the interests of children, and thus properly pro-
hibited. Consider, as a central example, the continuing controversy
over whether sex education should be compulsory, what should be
contained within it, and when children should be taught the facts of
life.5  Here then is another battle about what it is proper to allow chil-
dren to see and to read. However, although the terrain is analogous to
the one Etzioni sketches in his article, this battle is fought not in the
name of the First Amendment right to free speech. Rather, it is
fought in the name of the developmental rights of children. Children
may not have a First Amendment right of access to certain kinds of
material, but they may have a developmental right of access to that
same material. Whether they do or not is another matter and beyond
the scope of this article.
55. See generally DAVID ARCHARD, SEX EDUCATION (2000); Special Issue: Moral Values
and Sex Education, 26 J. MORAL EDUC. 253 (1997).
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